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25X1A

20 September 1974

20-IX-74

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Mr. Robert Macy, Murphy Commission Representative and the DCI, 18 September 1974

Mr. Macy met with the DCI for approximately 45 minutes and [redacted] of the ICS was present. The discussion was limited to four items which Mr. Macy introduced.

1. The Consolidated Intelligence Budget. Mr. Macy inquired as to the appropriate timing for this document in order to optimize its usefulness to the OMB and increase its effectiveness. He also introduced the concept of Guidance issued by DCI at an early point in the planning cycle, suggesting that a selected number of programs might be "protected" by this procedure. Mr. Colby explained that his charge from the President was for an objective recommendation on the total size of the National Intelligence Program and the resources required to assure the Program's productiveness, and this had been responded to by the DCI providing annually to the President his "Recommendation." He does not visualize his charge to infer that he will involve himself in the detail of data required for a Budget, but he does see some need to better understand the base on some Programs in order to better judge the merits of the total resource requirements. He rejected the concept of "protecting" selected programs, explaining that in his view this would be non-productive in assisting him to objectively judge the total. Mr. Colby further explained that he had personally associated himself with the program reviews held this year, and that certain adjustments might be necessary in the future. He followed this by indicating that he could present his recommendations as early as October if this were deemed useful.

2. The Options Available to DCI for his Impact on the Political and Economic Issues Facing the United States. Mr. Macy remarked that in his review of the NSC structure and the Intelligence Community

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Staff's reflection of military presence, he was concerned that DCI's capability to impact appropriately on the economic and political issues of today could be somewhat obscure. Mr. Colby reminded Mr. Macy that Treasury had recently been made a member of NSCIC, and that with the reactivation of RAB and the activities of the EIC, he believed the existing structure was adequate. The presence of an NIO for Economics and Energy was also noted.

3. Ambassadorial Assistance on Directed Collection. Mr. Macy stated that on his various foreign travels it had occurred to him that perhaps the CIA Chief of Station should be in a position of the Ambassador's chief advisor, and that in this way appropriate focus on Washington collection priorities might be implemented. Mr. Colby rejected this suggestion by pointing out that the development of Station Chiefs' careers was directed toward a more restricted responsibility. Mr. Colby further reflected that while intelligence in the past had been largely focused on the strategic military requirements, he can rely increasingly on the Military for this information, and that existing inadequacies in economic and energy collection and reporting can be eliminated. One 25X1

4. The Open Budget. Mr. Macy inquired whether or not there appeared to be new activity on the question of giving greater visibility to the U.S. intelligence resource figures. Mr. Colby said that he had been consistent in his view that one year's figures caused no problem, but he could foresee a capability, if this were the policy in the future, to develop trend lines which lead to questions as to reasons for change, which in turn lead to questioning the base. This capability would concern him. However, he continues to feel that this problem is essentially a Congressional one, and he will respond to the guidance he receives.

ICS

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DCI/IC 74-2309

3 SEP 1974

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: [REDACTED] C/CS/IC  
Mr. Robert Macy, Murphy Commission

DATE : 28 August 1974

1. Mr. Macy and [REDACTED] discussed the problems of national and tactical intelligence. [REDACTED] pointed out that the DCI is in charge of all intelligence, [REDACTED] He discussed the President's November 1971 and March 1974 directives to the DCI and added that OMB and Congress also want the DCI to exercise authority and leadership over the entire Community. He mentioned that the Community budget must take cognizance of the tactical resources and stressed the difficulty in defining tactical and national intelligence. [REDACTED] suggested that "tactical" might better be defined as "military force support" intelligence. He said that the same piece of intelligence information could be tactical to some users and national to others.

2. Mr. Macy wanted to know about the role of the Ambassador, the extent of his authority, and how he was able to balance collection in any given country. [REDACTED] discussed the need to refine requirements, particularly for FSOs, to provide "rifle" guidance. He stressed that efforts are being made to refine guidance to FSOs and to bring the Foreign Service as an institution more effectively into the field of intelligence reporting.

3. [REDACTED] and Mr. Macy discussed the concept of the NIOs. The Admiral pointed out the advantages of having one person responsible and accountable for intelligence estimates. He stressed that the new NIO system represents a Community rather than a parochial approach to this important responsibility of intelligence.

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25X1 4. Mr. Macy wondered whether it might not be possible to use INR as a channel to FSOs and the Embassies. [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] agreed, but said that topic could be better addressed by others.

5. Mr. Macy closed by saying that he was interested in "multilateral channels" of intelligence information, such as the UN. He said he believed that the increasing sophistication of other countries will eventually force intelligence STATINTL to turn more and more to overt sources of information.

[redacted]  
D/CS/S

STATINTL

DCI/IC/CS [redacted]:saw (30 Aug 74)

Distribution:

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0 - [redacted]  
1 - AD/DCI/IC (hold)  
1 - IC Registry  
1 - CS Subj.  
1 - CS Chrono  
1 - [redacted] Chrono

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DCI/IC 74-2308

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, D/DCI/IC  
[redacted] IC Staff  
Mr. Robert Macy, Murphy Commission

DATE : 28 August 1974

1. Mr. Macy opened the conversation by stating that he had several quite general questions focusing on the general topic of whether ongoing programs got sufficient attention to ensure that older, unproductive programs were weeded out as new programs were adopted. He wanted specifically to know whether the composition of IRAC were not so weighted with collectors of intelligence as to make it essentially a self-protective entity. He also mentioned that the KIQs and the Perspectives seemed to be so broadly drawn that any program could find something in them that would justify its existence.
2. General Graham responded that the IC Staff is the most effective way to look at the various competing programs. He stressed that the Staff, which is composed of representatives of all Community entities, has no axe to grind and no institutional imperative. He also discussed the fact that the IC Staff is responsible for presenting the Community budget, which is the DCI's best pressure point for reducing duplication of effort. He suggested that it is increasingly apparent to members of the Community that they must justify to the DCI (via the IC Staff) their programs or he will not defend them before the Congress. General Graham also mentioned that program issues are worked on all year long and that members of the IC Staff sit in on these discussions.
3. Mr. Macy also wanted to discuss the criticisms he said he has heard that the Intelligence Community is too slow to respond to the needs of policy-makers. General Graham said that the NSCIC is again functioning and may help

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to ensure better communications between producers and consumers of intelligence. He agreed that intelligence could be deemed late if it had to respond to a question from a policy-maker--it should have anticipated his needs. General Graham said he felt that the NSCIC working groups should be changed to include consumer representatives and, indeed, should be chaired by a consumer rather than by an intelligence officer. He also discussed the use of the KIQs and sub-KIQs to develop an audit trail so that resource expenditures can be tied to substantive needs.

4. Mr. Macy asked whether General Graham believed the DCI needed additional authority to exercise positive leadership of the Intelligence Community. General Graham said he believed such allegations probably reflected criticisms of past DCIs rather than the current conditions. He said the establishment of the IC Staff was a major step toward giving the DCI a handle on resources, which in turn gives him significant influence on the Community. General Graham mentioned the need to codify the NSCIDs and discussed the proposed omnibus SECRET NSCID.

Daniel O. Graham  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

STATINTL

DCI/IC/CS/S. [ ] saw (30 Aug 74)

Distribution:

0 - D/DCI/IC

1 - AD/DCI/IC (hold)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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REF THE ATTACHED MURPHY COMMISSION SET OF  
QUESTIONS --I FAIL TO SEE THE RELATION SH IP  
BETWEEN MOST OF THESE QUESTIONS AND THE PROBLEM  
OF THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.  
THESE~~EX~~ QUESTIONS RESOLVE AROUND QUESTIONS OF  
INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE  
OUTPUT TO THE FOREIGN POLICYMAKERS.

ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS ,IN EFFECT, WOULD GIVE  
THE INTERVIEWEE ACCESS TO WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY  
A MATTER OF OPINION RATHER THAN FACTUAL INFORMATION  
OR HARD DATA.THERE ARE NO AGREED ANSWERS TO MANY  
OF THESE QUESTIONS --AND THE OPINIONS OF LOW LEVEL  
MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY WOULD N OT BE ADEQUATE OR  
NECESSARILY VALID. AN SWERING THE INQUIRIES WOULD  
OR SHOULD INVOLVE THE DCI,GEN GRAHAM,[REDACTED]  
GEORGE CARVER, ETC --AND CONVINCING THEM THEY SH)ULI  
PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE MAY NOT BE EASY.  
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OUTLINE OF STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

A. Organization

1. Presidential Leadership, consisting of the NSC Intelligence Committee (Kissinger, DCI, Attorney General, Under-Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the JCS), and the 40 Committee (Kissinger, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DCI and Chairman of JCS), plus Net Assessment Group and Verification Panel.

General Questions:

a. In the 1950s the DCI regularly gave an intelligence briefing at the start of the weekly NSC meeting. This was a practical way of fulfilling the provision that the CIA reported to the NSC, and provided an excellent opportunity to make the most effective use of finished intelligence for top policy guidance. Today the NSC seldom meets and this channel for disseminating intelligence to policy makers is largely lost. Is there a serious need today to find an alternate effective channel for reaching policy makers with national intelligence?

Questions on Intelligence Committee:

a. With Kissinger so preoccupied elsewhere, how can this set-up work? Is it assumed that in practice the DCI will run these two Committees as Kissinger's deputy? How can the DCI be objective when he is an interested party?

b. How can the NSC Intelligence Committee give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and

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without the necessary staff? Can this Committee composed of busy very senior officials initiate, or only react?

c. What has Mr. Colby done about the Intelligence Committee activities and mandate since he became DCI? Has an orderly procedure been developed for soliciting the views of intelligence users?

d. Is there a conflict between the President's 1971 order to give the DCI a very broad leadership role including review of Community member budgets, and placing control over all US intelligence activities in the NSC staff through making Kissinger chairman of key committees and groups? If the DCI is in practice to run this top management set up, are you not thereby blurring the DCI's historic role as only an "operator" by putting him in the middle of top policy making? Is it also contrary to the law that places CIA under the NSC?

Questions on 40 Committee::

a. Has the committee review of on-going covert action projects since 1967 been useful? Do members other than CIA have independent information on results?

b. Should the members of this Committee have more opportunity to study the proposals before a Committee meeting? Does Kissinger get any real briefing beforehand? What staff does he have? How are they in a position to verify statements in proposals?

c. Should the 40 Committee also be concerned with major espionage projects, just as much as covert action projects?

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2. Management of Intelligence Community, consisting of the DCI and his Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, United States Intelligence Board, and National Intelligence Officers.

Questions about the DCI:

a. Is the DCI handicapped in carrying out his leadership role spelled out by President Nixon because he can really only advise DOD on intelligence operations and its budget, and he has no one focal point to deal with on top operational matters short of the Secretary of Defense? Has he been compromised by large transfers of funds from DOD to CIA? Or does his problem really stem from the fact (if true) that the President and Mr. Kissinger are in practice not interested in close control of intelligence operations?

b. In view of the nature of intelligence activities, would really tight management control by the DCI be desirable?

c. What should be done about secrecy? New legislation? More open relationships with Congress to reduce leaks designed to help get Congressional support for departmental budgets?

Questions about the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee:

a. Have the efforts of this Committee to prepare a consolidated Community budget been useful? Resulted in important recommendations? How many of recommendations acted upon? Or do members merely use Committee

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besides preparing a budget? Is there tangible evidence that the Committee has contributed to the effectiveness of the Community?

c. Are there organizational and procedural changes that could increase the Committee's effectiveness?

Questions about the United States Intelligence Board:

a. How are the collection requirements and priorities set by USIB reflected in Community members' budgets, and in the DCI's consolidated budget with recommendations?

b. How are these collection requirements and priorities determined? Just who analyzes the consumers' needs? What guidance on priorities is there at the Presidential level? NSC Intelligence Committee? Washington Special Action Group?

c. The 12-to-14 man Board of National Estimates with 40 to 50 specialists has been phased out and replaced by 8 senior CIA officers known as National Intelligence Officers. These officers draft National Intelligence Estimates, coordinate them with the staff of the <sup>Community</sup> Committee members, and submit them to the USIB for approval. This change was made to provide Kissinger's NSC staff with quick assessments of questions of immediate concern. Long range assessments have been largely dropped. Has this change increased the ability of the Community to respond to priority needs of intelligence consumers? Are these estimates really much better than current intelligence? Do they tend

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to be much less balanced and reliable than under the

previous set up?

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Is the DOD now unnecessarily duplicating the National Intelligence Estimates of enemy capabilities produced by USIB?

e. Does the DCI lack Presidential support in seeking carefully balanced estimates uninfluenced by Community member budgetary considerations?

3. Management of Intelligence activities in DOD, including Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, DIA, and the Executive Committee for Reconnaissance (Ass't. Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DCI, and Kissinger)

Questions on Secretary of Defense:

a. Are the classified executive orders called National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) adequate for controlling DOD operations on the National intelligence collection programs? Are their provisions sufficiently precise?

b. If DOD intelligence collection is not responsive to consumer needs, or proves to be too unreliable, whom does the Secretary of Defense hold accountable? Dr. Hall? Admiral de Poix? Others?

c. Does the Sec Def have an adequate independent machinery for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of his intelligence activities? Where is it?

d. If it is true that the DCI is really unable to exercise overall management of the Intelligence Community- STATINTL

does this mean that Sec Def must have a "DCI" with auth-

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ority to perform for intelligence activities of DOD what

the DCI was supposed to do for the whole Community?

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Or does it mean that the top intelligence official of the DOD should assume the role of the DCI for the whole Community and wear two hats? Or that the DCI should be part of the NSC set-up in the Office of the President? Questions on Assistant Secretary for Intelligence:

a. Dr. Hall, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, says that he "is the senior staff advisor to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters". He says that the Director of DIA is the "principal substantive intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence staff advisor to the JCS". In practice, just what is the difference between these two jobs vis-a-vis the Sec Def? Do either of them have any line responsibilities for NRO, NSA, and the three services?

b. How do these two officials find out what is really going on? Have either of them set any standards or goals against which to evaluate intelligence activities? How do they find out, for example, if the supply of and the capacity for processing raw intelligence in the DOD are in balance?

Questions on DIA:

a. Has the DIA in fact been able to consolidate the views of the three <sup>service</sup> ~~serve~~ agencies for purpose of speaking with one voice at the USIB? Has it recently gone too far in the direction of duplicating the work of USIB with reference to estimates of enemy capabilities?

b. Are there important opportunities for DIA to go much further in consolidating the functions of the three services?

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c. Does experience suggest that DIA should

under the JCS because of the relationship between in-  
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telligence and the size of the DOD budget?

d. What responsibility does DIA have for reviewing the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) of the DOD? Does the Sec Def look primarily to Dr. Hall or to Admiral de Poix for advice on this budget? Which one represents DOD on the IRAC?

Questions on the Executive Committee for Reconnaissance:

a. Does Dr. Kissinger ever attend meetings of this Committee? If not, who speaks for him?

b. What responsibility does this Committee have for bringing the supply of and effective demand for raw intelligence into balance?

c. To what extent are this Committee, and the USIB committee that does the detailed work on priorities, subject to the program spelled out in the approved NRO annual budget?

d. Is this Committee fully concerned with reviewing on-going as well as new programs? Are its actions cleared with the JCS or Sec Def?

e. What evaluation resources are available to this Committee?

4. Congressional and other Oversight, by two Armed Services and two appropriations committees, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Questions on Congressional committees:

a. Should there be a more formal, active Congressional Committee on Intelligence matters, covering not

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Intelligence Community? Does

Representative Zablocki's proposal for a Joint Committee



on Intelligence make sense?

b. What should be the purpose of Congressional oversight? Review political implications of covert operation  
Review a consolidated budget for the Intelligence Community  
Evaluate effectiveness of Community?

c. How can the Congress get hold of the most objective national intelligence available for purposes of reviewing the DOD budget? Should such intelligence be subject to prior review by the OMB after being reviewed by DCI? What are the organizational implications within the Executive Branch of a need for more solid intelligence to support the DOD budget? Is the Office of Strategic Research of CIA adequate to provide the DCI with the necessary check on DOD intelligence estimates? Would Senator Cooper's bill concerned with National Intelligence Estimates contribute to Congressional needs for more reliable intelligence?

d. Should the briefing of various Congressional groups be put on a more formal basis?  
Questions on President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

a. Just what is the purpose of the President's Board? To have readily available a group of private citizens to investigate any major failures that may occur in the Intelligence Community? To advise on the technological revolution that has taken place in intelligence collection? To serve as a watch dog? Etc.

b. What recommendations of this Board have been implemented in recent years? Should its recommendations

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What is so unique about intelligence that a Presidential Board is justified in this field and not in many other activities of the US Government?

B. Budget Process

1. Policy and program guidance included in instructions to various organizational units of each member of the Intelligence Community.

a. Does the President's Office and the DCI provide policy and program leadership at the start of the budget process, or do they merely react to proposed budget of the Community members? In other words, do the various organizational units of Community members receive rather detailed policy and program guidance in their instructions to prepare budget estimates, handed down either from the President's Office and DCI, or their own agency management, or both; or are they left pretty much on their own in preparing estimates?

b. If instructions on policy and programs are received, are they based on formal reviews of the previous year's operations, mid-term planning, long range goals, or an ad hoc compilation of policy and program instructions? If the instructions include monetary and personnel ceilings, are they agency-wide ceilings equally applicable to all agency activities? Do these ceilings reflect anticipated transfers of funds between members of the Community? Do they provide for ~~extra~~ ~~program~~ ~~major~~ ~~projects~~ ~~contingency funds~~?

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2. Objectives spelled out for each program or major

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units forced to spell out very concretely, preferably in quantitative terms, exactly what each program or major project is expected to accomplish during the next fiscal year?

b. Are objectives spelled out both for new and on-going projects and programs?

c. Are these detailed objectives later used as the basis for program evaluations? and meaningful progress reports?

### 3. Budget review

a. Are penetrating reviews made of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program by the offices of Dr. Hall and Admiral de Poix? Do their views carry much weight? Has the preparation of the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget Recommendations by the DCI proved to be a useful exercise? Just where is the weak link in their whole budget review process?

b. Does the Congress take its review of intelligence budgets very seriously? Does it get enough information to make a meaningful review?

C. Productivity in terms of proper allocation of resources, evaluation of operations, and choice of collection techniques.

#### 1. Resource allocation

a. What is the general view of informed persons regarding the allocation of collection resources for national intelligence? Is there a consensus on certain misallocations? Why have these misallocations not

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been corrected? Is there any consensus on what steps

should be taken to avoid serious misallocation of

of resources in the future?

b. What should be the proper criteria for determining the appropriate allocation of resources? Extent to which intelligence product is being used by consumers? Comparative costs of different collection methods? Quality of product of different collection methods? Availability of funds from Congress? Avoidance of duplication efforts?

Do

c. ~~Are~~ the most dubious allocations today include the continuing heavy emphasis in CIA on covert operations, the continuing unsuccessful attempts of NSA to crack codes in sophisticated countries, and the overriding concern for military intelligence?

## 2. Evaluation of operations

a. Mr Colby reports that there is very little evaluation of performance of the Intelligence Community at this time. There is a serious lack of strong standard of pre-established user requirements against which intelligence activities to be measured. Evaluations that have been made were largely ad hoc examinations precipitated by some crisis within the Community. What is the status of Mr. Colby's reported instruction to develop appropriate evaluation machinery?

b. What evaluation machinery has been established (if any) by the individual members of the Intelligence Community? Is such machinery adequate? What standards have been established against which to evaluate programs?

Is the machinery so that its findings carry the necessary weight to result in correct-

3. Choice of intelligence techniques

a. Does the Community have any effective focal point for determining the appropriate intelligence collection techniques that should be used? If not, how are the techniques determined in practice?

b. Is there coordinated research to determine new or improved techniques in sophisticated countries, particularly for purposes of determining "intent" and the "internal power structure" of countries being targeted? Should there be coordinated research for making more effective use of overt activities of the U.S. Embassies in sophisticated countries in which it is most difficult to recruit high level agents or crack codes?

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director/OPR  
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Lew--

STATINTL The Director has approved our  
talking to Bill Barnds when he is in town.  
[ ] IC Staff will be arranging the  
schedule for Barnds and will be contacting  
you.

/s/  
Ed Proctor

4 September 1974  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director/OER

Maurice--

STATINTL The Director has approved our  
talking to Bill Barnds when he is in town.  
[ ] IC Staff will be arranging the  
schedule for Barnds and will be contacting  
you.

/s/  
Ed Proctor

4 September 1974  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DCI/IC-75-0574

16 APR 1975

Mr. William I. Bacchus  
Associate Research Director  
Commission on the Organization of the  
Government for the Conduct of  
Foreign Policy  
2025 M Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Bill:

In response to your letter of 2 April 1975, we have taken a look at the papers you sent us by Coplin and O'Leary, Joan Hochman, and Gregory Treverton. We see no security problems with these papers and very much appreciate having had an opportunity to review them.

I will expect to hear from you later about any other papers you might wish to have reviewed.

Sincerely,

/s/

[Redacted]  
Intelligence Community Staff

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Distribution:

- 0 - Adsee.
- 1 - CS Subject
- 1 - CS Chrono
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DCI/ICS/CS [Redacted]

(15 April 1975)

2025 M STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 2, 1975

STATINTL

STATINTL

[redacted]  
Intelligence Community Staff  
Washington, D. C.

STATINTL

Dear [redacted]

As promised in our earlier conversation, I am forwarding for your perusal several items prepared for the Commission by outside researchers, which directly or indirectly drew upon intelligence community sources.

The field reporting study done by Coplin and O'Leary has very little reference to the CIA. Moreover, these references are drawn from people outside the agency. All information from the interviews is used only as part of the aggregated data which appears in the first chapter and is analyzed in chapter 4. In recommendation 6 in the summary and also on page 34, there is a reference to the Intelligence Institute. Tom Reckford tells me that this reference, which he in fact suggested in an earlier draft, should cause no problems.

The next item is Joan Hochman's revised paper on the cutoff of AID to India in 1971. This reflects changes suggested by Hal Saunders and the State Department, and as far as I can see has nothing in it which would cause you difficulty. Obviously if you find otherwise, please let me know.

The third item is the version of Gregory Treverton's IPC case which we propose to use. Again, I see no direct references that I believe would cause any difficulty if published.

With respect to the other items that were on our list, the following applies. First, as we both suspected, Graham Allison's discussions really were not substantive, and he did not draw upon anything he was told by individuals at the CIA in what he has written. Similarly, the only interview by Alexander George, with one of your medical representatives, does not show up at any point in his work. In fact, quoting George's